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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 920344-CA
Priority No. 11

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
defendant's motion to suppress in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable George
E. Ballif, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was the initial stop of defendant's vehicle

supported by reasonable suspicion where the trooper making the
stop estimated that the vehicle was travelling at a speed of 75
m.p.h., ten m.p.h. over the posted speed limit?

A trial court's

finding of reasonable suspicion is a finding of fact that this
Court reviews under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) (A trial court's
finding of reasonable suspicion is a finding of fact that will be
reversed only if it is demonstrated to be clearly erroneous.).
2.

Given that the State concedes that the trooper did

not have a reasonable suspicion to justify asking defendant
whether he was carrying any illegal narcotics or weapons, was
defendant's subsequent consent to search obtained by police
exploitation of that prior illegality?

Although the trial court

did not conduct an exploitation analysis because it found no
prior illegality, this Court may nevertheless decide the issue
based on the undisputed facts contained in the record.

Cf.. State

v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990) (even though
trial court did not expressly resolve voluntariness of consent
question, remand was unnecessary because the record was
sufficiently developed below to allow determination of issue on
appeal based an undisputed facts).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules for a determination of this case are as follows:
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and his co-defendant, Michael McNaughton1,
were charged by information with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in
1

Mr, McNaughton has not joined defendant in this
interlocutory appeal, Br. of Appellant at 4.

2

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992) (R.
1).

Both defendants filed motions to suppress, which were denied

by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing (R. 88-92,
96-99).

Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal from

an interlocutory order, and this Court granted defendant's
petition (R. 103-04).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the
arresting officer, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Lance Bushnell,
was the only witness called to testify.

Following the hearing,

the trial court entered a signed memorandum decision, and later,
the trial court entered additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law (R. 88-92, 96-99).

(Copies of the trial

court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as its
memorandum decision are attached hereto as Addendum A and
Addendum B, respectively.)

The following statement of facts is

based on the trial court's findings, and, where appropriate, a
more detailed account of the facts is provided based on the
uncontroverted testimony of Trooper Bushnell.
On July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, a four year
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol who was certified at
estimating the speeds of motor vehicles, observed a car
travelling in the opposite direction on 1-15 near Nephi (R. 147150).

Bushnell estimated that the vehicle was travelling at a

speed of approximately 75 m.p.h., ten m.p.h. over the posted
speed limit (R. 150).
3

Because the radar gun he was using that day did not
have the capacity to determine the speed of cars going the
opposite direction across the median, Bushnell decided to cross
the median and pace the vehicle from behind.

Although he allowed

the vehicle to drive further down the road before he crossed the
freeway, defendant — who was driving the car —

apparently saw

Bushnell cross the median because when Bushnell caught up to the
car it had slowed down to 60 m.p.h. —

5 m.p.h. under the posted

speed limit (R. 150-51, 167-69).
Bushnell was not able to verify defendant's speed
either by pacing or with a radar gun (169).

He therefore decided

to simply warn defendant to slow down (R. 152, 162-65).
Bushnell's decision was in keeping with his policy of issuing
only a warning instead of a speeding citation in cases in which
he was unable to verify his visual estimate of a vehicle's speed
(R. 166). In the instant case, Bushnell decided to give
defendant a hand signal to keep his speed down (151-52, 171).
Bushnell pulled along side the vehicle, but neither
defendant nor his passenger would look at Bushnell.

Unable to

convey a hand signal, Bushnell fell back behind the vehicle and
then pulled along side the car one more time to try and attract
the attention of the driver or the passenger (R. 152, 171).
Again, neither the driver nor the passenger would look toward the
trooper (R. 171).
After making two unsuccessful attempts to issue
defendant an informal warning to slow down via a hand signal,
4

Bushnell stopped the vehicle to issue a warning citation (R.
152).

Upon stopping the vehicle, the trooper approached

defendant and asked for a driver's license and registration.
Defendant produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce
a vehicle registration form.

Defendant indicated that he had

borrowed the car from a friend from Minnesota2 named "Bill," but
he could provide no other information about the car's owner (15253).
As he searched for the registration form, defendant
appeared to be extremely nervous.
his hands were trembling.

He was moving very quickly and

Defendant eventually found an

insurance information form with the name "William Kayler" upon
it, which he gave to the trooper (152-55).
Bushnell began to suspect that the car may have been a
stolen vehicle because of defendant's inability to produce a
proper vehicle registration form as well as his inability to
provide a full name of the vehicle's owner or any other
information about the owner.

Defendant's highly nervous

behavior, which Bushnell indicated was much greater than that
typically exhibited by other drivers stopped for traffic
violations, served to reinforce Bushnell's suspicion that
something was awry (R. 153, 172-72).

Under these circumstances,

Bushnell decided to request an N.C.I.C. check on the vehicle to
see if it had been reported stolen (R. 179).
The report came back negative and indicated that the
2

The car carried Minnesota license plates (R. 152).
5

vehicle was owned by a person named "William Kayler," the same
name that appeared on the insurance form that defendant found in
the vehicle (R. 178). However, Bushnell testified that stolen
vehicles are not always promptly listed as having been reported
stolen.

Indeed, although he did not know how long it typically

took officials in Minnesota to post a stolen vehicle report,
Bushnell testified that in California it takes two days for such
a report to be filed (R. 178-80).

Moreover, Bushnell had

personally recovered stolen cars on other occasions —

even

though N.C.I.C. checks had failed to indicate that the vehicle
had been reported stolen (R. 205).3
Bushnell returned to the vehicle and asked defendant
where they had been and where they were going.

Defendant

answered that they had been to California and were going back
home to Minnesota (153-54).

Bushnell then asked if there were

any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle.

Defendant said that he

had no knowledge about anything of that sort being in the vehicle
(R. 154). Bushnell followed up his question by asking M[d]o you

3

The record is less than clear on the question of exactly
when Bushnell ran the N.C.I.C. check and whether he had received
the results before he asked defendant for consent to search the
vehicle. Indeed, in its initial ruling the trial court indicated
only that "[i]t is unclear from the facts whether the officer
asked for consent to search the car while he was waiting for the
results of NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was
not listed as stolen when he asked for consent" (R. 90).
Nevertheless, based on its subsequently entered findings of fact,
it appears that the trial court determined that Bushnell knew the
results of the check before he asked for consent to search (R.
98). Because of the ambiguity in the record, it cannot be said
that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous.
6

mind if we* look?"

The trial court found that defendant

"unhesitatingly replied[,] 'help yourself" (R. 98), and
defendant got out of the car (R. 155).
Bushnell then asked the passenger, co-defendant
McNaughton, to get out of the vehicle. McNaughton got out of the
car and stood behind it with defendant, out of the lane of
traffic (R. 155).
As McNaughton exited the vehicle, Bushnell asked him
his name.

McNaughton "just grabbed his wallet and started

digging through his wallet" (R. 155). McNaughton's hands were
visibly shaking as he passed over his driver's license three
separate times.

Bushnell finally stopped McNaughton and said,

"[ijsn't that [your driver's license] right there?" (R. 156).
McNaughton quickly reached for his license and tried to remove it
from his wallet.

However, because he was moving so quickly and

shaking so badly, McNaughton spilled all the contents of his
wallet onto the ground.

Bushnell asked McNaughton why he was so

nervous and McNaughton responded that he was nervous because he
didn't come in contact with the police very often (156).
Bushnell testified that McNaughton's extreme nervousness served
to further reinforce his suspicion that the two men had stolen
the vehicle (R. 182).
As Bushnell began to search the vehicle, he immediately
found a package of "Zig Zag" rolling papers inside a Nike court

A

By "we" Trooper Bushnell was referring to himself and
Deputy Bill Thompkins, who was riding with Bushnell (R. 155).
7

shoe in the back seat (R. 156-57).

Bushnell stated that such

papers are typically used to roll marijuana cigarettes, but that
they can also be used for rolling tobacco.

However, the trooper

found neither tobacco nor marijuana in the vehicle (R. 188-89).
Bushnell asked both men if they owned the papers, but neither of
the two claimed ownership (R. 157).
The trooper could not understand why neither would
admit to owning the rolling papers because it is not illegal to
possess such papers (R. 157, 190). The denial of ownership,
coupled with the driver's inability to produce a vehicle
registration form or to identify the owner of the vehicle beyond
stating that his name was "Bill," as well as the extreme
nervousness of both defendant and his companion, caused Bushnell
to suspect not only that the vehicle was stolen, but also that
the two might be transporting illegal narcotics. According to
Bushnell, the latter suspicion was also based in part on his
having previously encountered —

in

about 30 percent of his

prior felony narcotics arrests — drug traffickers who were
travelling in a vehicle that was either stolen or had been loaned
to them by a third party (R. 177, 193-95).
Bushnell then searched the trunk of the vehicle, but he
found nothing of consequence.

He also asked defendant if he

could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and defendant
said "[g]o ahead" (R. 157). Again, the trooper found no
contraband (R. 157).
Bushnell then searched under the hood of the car.
8

There he saw an oil cloth wedged between the battery and interior
wall of the right front fender.

Bushnell felt the cloth and

could tell that it contained something that felt like a brick of
narcotics like he had seized on other occasions (R. 157-60, 19293).

Further inspection revealed that the cloth covered a brown

grocery bag that contained a kilogram of cocaine (R. 160-61).
Defendant and McNaughton were then arrested and charged
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (R. 159).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant was initially the subject of a routine
traffic stop for speeding.

Bushnell estimated that defendant's

vehicle was travelling at a rate of approximately 75 m.p.h., and
he stopped defendant's vehicle to issue a warning citation after
he was unable to simply warn the driver to slow down via a hand
signal.

The initial stop was therefore proper because it was

supported by a reasonable suspicion that defendant had exceeded
the posted speed limit.
However, Bushnell exceeded the scope of detention
permitted for a routine traffic stop when he asked defendant
whether there were any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle.
Because Bushnell had no basis to suspect defendant was engaged in
criminal activity involving weapons or narcotics, the State
concedes that the trooper's inquiry and the attendant detention
were impermissible.
Given this prior illegality, the validity of
defendant's consent to search must be analyzed under the two9

pronged Arroyo test.

Defendant has never challenged the validity

of his consent based on the "voluntariness" prong, and the trial
court found that defendant unhesitatingly replied "help yourself"
when Bushnell sought his consent to search the vehicle.

Because

defendant does not challenge that finding, the first prong of
Arroyo is not at issue in this case.
Defendant does argue that his consent was tainted by
the prior illegality, and that the evidence seized in the
subsequent search must therefore be suppressed.

Defendant's

argument must fail because his consent was not obtained by
exploitation of the illegal detention.
As the Utah Supreme Court recently made clear in State
v. Thurman, No. 910494 (Utah January 7, 1993), the policy
objective underlying the attenuation analysis is deterrence of
police misconduct.

Because the issue of whether an officer, in

the course of a routine traffic stop, could ask the question
posed by Bushnell had not been addressed by Utah's appellate
courts at the time of this incident, Bushnell's action cannot be
deemed a flagrant act of misconduct or an egregious violation of
the law.

This Court should therefore uphold the trial court's

denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that
defendant's consent to search was not obtained by police
exploitation of a prior illegality and is therefore valid.

X0

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE BUSHNELL HAD OBSERVED
DEFENDANT TRAVELLING AT A SPEED OF
APPROXIMATELY 75 M.P.H., TEN M.P.H. OVER THE
POSTED SPEED LIMIT.
The trial court's finding that the initial stop of
defendant to issue a warning for speeding was supported by
reasonable suspicion is not clearly erroneous.5

This Court

should therefore uphold the trial court's finding that the
initial stop of defendant was valid.
A review of the record demonstrates, and the trial
court expressly found, that Bushnell visually estimated the speed
of defendant's vehicle to be 75 m.p.h., which was well in excess
of the posted speed limit.

Numerous decisions from Utah's

appellate courts make clear that "as long as an officer suspects
the driver is violating 'any one of the multitude of applicable
traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer may
legally stop the vehicle."

State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883

n.3 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)
(citation omitted) (stop to issue a warning citation for leaving
5

The State recognizes that there has been an ongoing dialog
among members of this Court concerning the appropriate standard
of review to apply in various settings and that the Utah Supreme
Court in Thurman, No. 910494 slip op. at 21., adopted a
bifurcated standard of review for determinations of voluntariness
of consent and attenuation from a prior illegality. However,
until the Utah Supreme Court expressly overrules it express
holding in Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183, that reasonable suspicion is
a finding of fact reviewed for clear error, this Court must
continue to apply a clearly erroneous standard of review when
reviewing a trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion.
11

left blinker on for two miles was valid).

See also State v.

Sepulveda, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 2, 74 (Utah App. November 19,
1992) (stop for expired registration sticker was valid); State v.
Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1990) (stopping defendant for
following too closely and for not wearing seat belts was valid);
State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992) (stop for
speeding was valid); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815,
reh'q denied, 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) (stop for speeding
was valid).
Bushnell is certified at estimating vehicle speeds to
within five miles per hour.

However, he was unable to confirm

that speed either by pacing or by radar.

In keeping with his

personal policy in such situations, Bushnell decided to simply
warn defendant to slow down.

Initially, Bushnell attempted to

warn defendant by pulling along side the vehicle and using a hand
signal.

Because neither defendant nor his passenger would look

at him, Bushnell was unable to convey that warning.
Consequently, Bushnell stopped defendant with the intent to tell
defendant "to slow down and [to] let [him] go" after issuing that
warning (R. 176) .
The trial court recognized all of these factors in its
findings:
1. On July 20, 1991, on 1-15 within
Juab County, Utah, Trooper Lance Bushnell, a
four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol,
observed a motor vehicle in the area of
Nephi, and visually estimated the speed to be
in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar
reading on the vehicle. The officer had
12

received training and certification in
estimating speeds.
2. The officer turned and followed the
vehicle to obtain a paced speed, but the
vehicle had slowed and was now travelling 60
m.p.h.. He then pulled alongside the vehicle
with the intent of giving the driver a hand
signal to slow down. Neither the driver nor
the passenger would look towards him so he
could signal them to slow down. The officer
then stopped the vehicle with the intent of
giving the driver a warning concerning his
speed.
(R. 97).
The trooper's testimony that defendant was speeding was
uncontroverted.

Consequently, despite defendant's protestations

that "the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe
defendant had committed a crime" (Br. of Appellant at 8), the
trial court's finding that the initial stop of defendant was
supported by reasonable suspicion should be upheld.

See Castner,

825 P.2d at 702 (stop for speeding was valid).
POINT II
THE STATE CONCEDES THAT TROOPER BUSHNELL
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF DETENTION PERMISSIBLE
DURING A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP BY ASKING
DEFENDANT WHETHER THERE WERE ANY WEAPONS OR
NARCOTICS IN THE VEHICLE AND THAT THE OFFICER
LACKED THE REQUISITE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
JUSTIFY MAKING THAT INQUIRY.
This Court discussed the fourth amendment parameters
for routine traffic stops in State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431
(Utah App. 1990).

As explained in Robinson:

An officer conducting a routine traffic
stop may request a driver's license and
vehicle registration, conduct a computer
check, and issue a citation. United States
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.
13

1988), However, once the driver has produced
a valid license and evidence of entitlement
to use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to
proceed on his way, without being subject to
further delay by police for additional
questioning." JTd. Any further temporary
detention for investigative questioning after
the fulfillment of the purpose for the
initial traffic stop is justified under the
fourth amendment only if the detaining
officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious
criminal activity. Ld.; United States v.
Walker, [933 F.2d 812, reh'q denied, 941 F.2d
1086 (10th Cir. 1991)]. The detaining
officers must be able to articulate a
particularized and objective basis for their
suspicions that is drawn from the totality of
circumstances facing them at the time of the
seizure. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95, 66
L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see State v. Mendoza, 748
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) .
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435.
In the instant case, Bushnell detained the driver to
run a N.C.I.C. check to see whether the vehicle was stolen.

This

action was within the proper scope of the traffic stop because
defendant failed to produce a vehicle registration form or
evidence of entitlement to use of vehicle.

Consequently, to the

extent that the trooper detained defendant in order to verify
that defendant's use of the vehicle was permissive, the detention
was proper.
However, under this Court's recent decision in State v.
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992), when the trooper
asked defendant whether there were any weapons or narcotics in
the vehicle, he exceeded the scope of detention permitted for a
routine traffic stop.

Therefore, in order for the attendant

detention to be valid, Bushnell had to have a reasonable
14

suspicion of other criminal activity.
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).

There the Court held that when "a police

officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity is
afoot • • • ," he may make an investigative stop to confirm or
dispel his suspicion,

Terry, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.

The Court also

has noted that "[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion, like
probable cause, is not 'readily or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules.'"

United States v. Sokolow,

U.S.

, 190 S. Ct. 1581, 1588 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317,

(1983)).

Finally, in United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695
(1981), the Court held that the existence of reasonable suspicion
is to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances.
This Court has adopted these standards.

See, e.g., Godina-Luna,

826 P.2d at 654-55; Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435; State v. Holmes,
774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935,
941 (Utah App. 1988) .
There is abundant evidence in the record to support a
finding that the trooper reasonably suspected that the vehicle
was stolen, and he could have properly continued to investigate
that possibility.

However, Bushnell's questioning of defendant

about weapons and narcotics was unrelated to the issue of whether
the vehicle was stolen.

The question shifted the scope of the
15

detention to the issue of whether defendant was transporting
illegal drugs or weapons.
Under these circumstances, Bushnell had to have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity involving illegal drugs
or weapons to support the continued detention*

The totality of

the facts known to Bushnell at that point in his investigation,
namely that defendant could not produce evidence of his
entitlement to use the vehicle or identify the owner by his full
name and the extremely high level of nervousness exhibited by the
two men, cannot support a finding of the requisite reasonable
suspicion mandated by Godina-Luna.

The State therefore concedes

that the continued detention of defendant violated the

fourth

amendment.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE WAS
VALID UNDER STATE V, THURMAN.
Even though the investigative detention of defendant
was illegal because it was not supported by a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity involving drugs or weapons, the
search of defendant's vehicle can still be sanctioned if
defendant's consent to that search was valid,6
6

Under State v.

As a threshold matter, the State concedes on appeal that
defendant has standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.
Defendant claimed that he had borrowed the car from a friend
named "Bill," and it appears from the record that Bushnell later
confirmed that defendant was in possession of the vehicle with
the owner's consent (R. 152, 181),, Despite the trial court's
contrary determination, these facts adequately demonstrate that
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle.
Cf. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 n.6 (defendant's uncontested
(continued...)
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Arroyo, 796 P.zet f»t.<4 , (JH8 (Ulan jyyO), tnc iuquji> m m

WTIH-T

lu I .

consent to search is lawfully obtained following illegal police
action iii/i ist focus on two factors: (1) whether the consent was
voluntary, and (2) whether the consent wab obtained by police
exploitation of the prior Illegality.
T j i e v a l i d i t y Q £ defendant's consent
under the voluntariness prong of
Arroyo is not at issue in this
case.

Defendant has never contended that his consent w-db ".,i
given voluntarily.
t

•.»•;;'

Indeed, ii: :-• signed memorandum decision,
"- •- '-i-1 :

-'

•

lot alleged any

police coercion c: duress, but claim[s] the search Is Invalid
under *-

f-

Likewx—

*

4

-. •-

the poisonous tree' analysis" (R. 9 0 ) .
- y . -

.

, """the consent to

search was given under circumstances that cannot be separated
from [the prior illegality].

The consent to search was

[ theref ore ] i ] ] ega ] 1 > obta i i Iei ill, a n ci 11 Ie evi d e n c e mi i s t b e
suppressed."

Br. of Appellant at 31

Given Trooper Bushnell's uncontroverted testimony, and
the trial court's finding 11 i a t < Ie f e i id a 111 "" 1111 h e s :i. t: a 11 n g 1 y r e v "J n t;,»c j
'help y o u r s e l f when Bushnell requested consent to search the
vehicle (F

"iBj, defendant

i

validity of his consent ..•• -

decision not *
he < "OJuntra

6

challenge the
ss prong of Arroyo

(•..continued)
testimony that he had been given permission by the owner to take
the van that he was driving on a two-week vacation was sufficient
to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van's
interior).
i /

is well measured.

Cf.. Sepulveda, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. at 75

(officer's uncontroverted testimony demonstrated defendant
voluntarily consented to search of his vehicle).

Defendant does,

however, challenge the validity of his consent on the ground that
it was not sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegality.7
2.

Arroyo's exploitation prong as
clarified in State v. Thurman.

Before analyzing the issue of whether defendant's
consent to search was sufficiently attenuated from the prior
illegality, a discussion of the parameters of Arroyo's
"exploitation" prong is in order.
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the analysis
to be conducted under the exploitation (or attenuation) prong of
Arroyo.

State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 7-11 (Utah

January 7, 1993).

Significantly, the Court began its discussion

of the exploitation prong with an unequivocal statement of the
policy consideration that underlies Arroyo:
Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police
from engaging in illegal conduct even though
that conduct may be followed by a voluntary
consent to the subsequent search.
7

Because the trial court found that there was no prior
illegality, it did not specifically consider the issue of whether
defendant's consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
detention. While it is generally appropriate to remand the case
to the trial court for the entry of additional findings in such
instances, that is not necessary in the instant case because
there are no disputed facts. ££. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 (even
though trial court did not expressly resolve voluntariness of
consent question, remand was unnecessary because the record was
sufficiently developed to allow determination of issue on appeal
based on undisputed facts). Consequently, this Court may review
the facts developed below to determine whether defendant's
consent was valid under the exploitation prong of Arroyo.
18

The deterrence rationale discussed
Arroyo is grounded in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). There,
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion
joined by now Chief Justice Rehnquist, made
it clear that the analysis used to invalidate
consent on the basis of exploitation was
grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes i)f
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 608-12.
Justice Powell's admonition that the
exploitation analysis "always should be
conducted with the deterrent purpose of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in
focus," id. at 6 1 2 , has become a cornerstone
of search and seizure jurisprudence. See 4
Search & Seizure § 1 ] 4 ( a ) , at 373: see also
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev.
3 7 8 , 390 (1964) [hereinafter A m s t e r d a m ] .
Thurman, No

910494, slip op. at 8-9.

Having identified the deter reii l. puipose nt the
exclusionary rule as the underpinning of the Arroyo exploitation
prong, the Thurman Court reiterated the factors by c o u r t s :

re

^onsidered

" [ 1) ] 'the purpose and flagra...

misconduct," [ 2 ) | the 'temporal proximity' of * *•
the consen ti ami, I
circumstances.'"

:j

.legality and

t I "the presence of intervening

.Id., at 9 (citations o m i t t e d ) .

The Thurman

Court then discussed each factor in greater d e t a i l , emphasizing
t

Lu^e throughout its

discussion.
Clearly, the "purpose and flagrancy" factor is the most
signi f ,1 cani m

I In

'iiiiee he

- *r

deterrent value of suppression."

.

!

. y related to the

.stations o m i t t e d ) .

A s such,- the first task a court must complete under the
e x p 1 o i t a t i c i I p i c > 11», j i f •« 1.»'.» c*"' h a i a c 1. e r i z e 11 i e n a 11 11: e a i I ci • i e g i: e e o f
Ji y

the prior illegality based on a continuum of "flagrancy" and
"egregiousness."
To put the continuum into perspective, it must first be
recognized that "'[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least negligent, conduct which [sic] has deprived
the defendant of some right. '"

Id,.

(quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at

612 (Powell, J., concurring) in turn quoting Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).

Consequently, at one end of the

continuum falls police misconduct that is "flagrantly abusive,
[such that] there is a greater likelihood that the police engaged
in the conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives," or
instances in which "the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve
the consent[.]"

Id., (citations omitted).

In such cases,

"suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future."

Id.

(footnote and citation omitted).
At the other end of the continuum lies instances in
which "the police had no 'purpose' in engaging in the
misconduct[.]

[F]or example, if the illegality arose because [a

court] later invalidated a statute on which the police had relied
in good faith—suppression would have no deterrent value."

Id.

(citations omitted).
Thurman then describes the relationship between the
other two factors, temporal proximity and intervening
circumstances, and the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary
20

rule

Specifically, •'[t]he deterrent value of suppressing

e- -• ^*:.:e seized f 1 lowing poJicti illegal.! ty is negligible where
the subsequent consent to search is substantially separated
either temporally or circumstantially from that illegality,"

Id.

Although Arroyo may not have been clear on this point,
Thurman unmistakably holds that "the exploitation analysis
requires a La lancing ".,,"1 the relative

egregi ousness of the

misconduct against the time and circumstances that intervene
before the consent is given."
added)

Thurman, slip op. at 10 (emphasis

Moreover,
[t]he nature and degree of the illegality
will usually be inversely related to the
effectiveness of time and intervening events
to dissipate the presumed taint. Where the
misconduct is extreme, we will require a
clean break in the chain of events between
the misconduct and the consent to find the
consent valid. . . . Conversely, where it
appears that the illegality arose as the
result of negligence, the lapse of time
between the misconduct and the consent and
the presence of intervening events become
• less critical to the dissipation of the
taint.

Id.

(citation omitted).
Thurmai i s i z:] arificati on of how the nature and degree of

the illegality is balanced against the intervening time and
circumstances stands

marked contrast

ci I 1 !H-J e x p 11' I I a t in i u in

App.)/ cert, denied,

i w.uc

':-• c*r

, :

808 P. 2d 14 J (Utah App.,, L ^ - . pending,
(

c trls

. r 4 , J 9 "J I ) .
01

:.:.._

^

Court's analysis
• 2d 456 (Utah

and State v. Sims,

: 't ah Adv. Rep. 9

In both Park and Sims, the defendants gave consent to
search their vehicles after being detained at police roadblocks,
which were later deemed to be illegal•

At the time the

roadblocks were set up, however, no decision from either Utah's
appellate courts or the United States Supreme Court had directly
ruled on the legality of such roadblocks.
808 P.2d at 142-50.

See generally Sims,

Thus, the roadblocks could not be fairly

characterized as flagrant violations of the fourth amendment or
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even though this
Court ultimately concluded that the roadblocks violated those
provisions.
In concluding that the defendant's "consent to search
his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of the illegal
roadblock," the Sims panel relied most heavily on two factors:
(1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop,
and not even under our clear error standard of review could the
trial court find enough

time between the stop and the grant of

consent to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2)
"the record reveal[ed] [no] possibility
circumstances

of

intervening

between the illegal stop and [the defendant's]

grant of consent to the search[.]"
(emphasis added).

Sims, 808 P.2d at 150-51

An identical approach was followed by the Park

panel in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion to suppress.

Park, 810 P.2d at 458-59.

Given Arroyo's ambiguous discussion of the exploitation
prong, it was not unreasonable for this Court in Sims and Park to
22

j nterpret Arrays ao requiring a clean break In the chain of
events between * nrio:
for that consent r

1. leycilily rim I .subsequent consent in order

te deemed valid.

Under the analytical framework utilized by the panels
in Sims and Park, the :

;

^t

defendant's consent i

search was *• ..-r sufficiently attenuated

froiTi the prior il]e~;

'

invalid,

*:\ '-

- ?r. ~h*- consent w^« therefore

Thurman, however, clear! J • ^

* -.ework.

-

Indeed, under Thurman defendant's consent should be deemed valid.
T2ie

in e g a iity that occurred in
this case was not egregious because
at the time that Bushnell asked
defendant whether there were any
weapons or narcotics in his vehicle
the issue of whether an officer, in
the course of a routine traffic
stop, could ask that question had
not been addressed by Utah's
appellate courts.
Recognizing that the poll cy underlying Arroyo is t, h«
deterrent value < • the exclusionary rule, suppression would be
i n a p p r upr i a t. e

j

t;• a u»: > I:ie c a 11 s e

P V PII t• h o 11 q h B u s h n e 1 1 e x c e e d e d

the permissible scope of detention, his actions do not constitute
flagrant misconduct or an egregious violation of the? law
Tl lis CouT t ii I in G o d i n a - L u n a :iiMii*-' C I ea i that arm o f f i c e r ,
as part of a routine traffic stop, may not legally ask the
question regarding narcotics and weapons *rn, Bushnell asked in
this case,

Ht%

Utah courts had ;
divided.

it tin? tini^ th,^ B^h

.•

-

-- defendant,

resolved that issue, and other courts were

The Tenth Circuit Court

issued inconsistent panel >

t Appeals?
-

! r example, had

In United States v. Walravenf 892 F.2d 972, 976 (10th
Cir. 1989), and United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654,
659 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 822 (1987), the
panels held that such questions, even though unsupported by
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, were permissible
during a routine traffic stop.

On the other hand, in United

States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 814-16 (10th Cir. 1991), the
panel held that extended detention of the defendant to ask such
questions, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, violated the fourth amendment.

See also United States

v. Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).

However, the Walker

panel dropped the following footnote in its opinion:
Under the reasoning of United States v.
Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir.
1990), our determination that defendant was
unlawfully detained might be different if the
questioning by the officer did not delay the
stop beyond the measure of time necessary to
issue a citation. For example, this case
would be significantly changed if the officer
asked the same questions while awaiting the
results of an NCIC license of registration
inquiry.
933 F.2d at 816 n.2.
In this case, Bushnell could have detained defendant to
further investigate defendant's failure to produce a vehicle
registration form or other evidence of his entitlement to use the
vehicle.

Cf.. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (once a driver has

produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be
allowed to proceed, without being subject to further delay by
24

police for additional questioning).

L'orusequenLly, under Walker,

Bushnell's conduct was arguably permissible because it did not
delay r. fie

si, ).,« beyond the time necessary to investigate the issue

of whether defendant had permissive use c: £ the vehicle

8

Two contemporaneous decisions from the California
courts reflect a split similar LO tha- evidenced ,
from the Tenth Circuit Court of Apoee

.

;~ .t-.-r.-- -;. ive
.b

People v. Lusardi, 228 Cal.App.3d Supp.
(Cal. Super

".he decisions
Compare

;al .Rptr. 80, 81

] 9"-f'i > | "'of f i cers making a proper traffic [stop]

cannot, on mere hunch, properly ask for consent to searchf;] the
consent obtained .- vitiated because the detention is unlawfully
t ,: •

cent iJKif'J of tftT

'.rpose has passed

People v. Galindo, 229 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1529, 281 CaJ,K{'
158 (Cal. App. 199:
d.-:>-

.* . '

officer's post-citation inquiry of

i

••'•-

*

•••••

•••*'•

:.." - o r a x u y s

in the car and request for permission to search car

was

proper).
U

•

*

- -

'o

address the issue of whether it was permissible for aii officer,
in the course of a routine traffic stop
posed liy Bufahne] 1 C.IIIH,! MI light, \>t MJI
other courts on the issue presented,
8

tc — ?• ~ht. question
a

. ,

cannot W

.
-;;

.

m

:.•

the

Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here,
this Court has similarly recognized that the "running of a
warrants check in the course of a traffic stop is permissible, so
long as i t does not significantly extend the period of detention
beyond that reasonably necessary to effectuate the original
purpose of the stop." State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276,
280 (Utah App. 1992) •

trooper's asking defendant whether there were any weapons or
narcotics in the vehicle constituted flagrant misconduct or an
egregious violation of the law.

Because the trooper's conduct in

this case was not clearly illegal —
proper —

and was indeed arguably

at the time of the encounter, no deterrent value would

be served by suppressing the evidence seized.
This case is akin to one in which "the illegality arose
because [a court] later invalidated a statute on which the police
had relied in good faith[;] suppression would [therefore] have no
deterrent value."

Thurman, slip op. at 9 (citation omitted).

Consequently, although the record indicates that there was no
temporal break or intervening circumstance between the asking of
the improper question and defendant's consent to search, this
Court should uphold defendant's consent to search under the
exploitation analysis articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in
Thurman.
To summarize briefly, the stop of defendant's vehicle
to issue a warning for speeding was proper because Trooper
Bushnell had estimated the speed of defendant's vehicle to be 10
m.p.h. over the posted speed limit. Although the trooper could
have properly continued to detain defendant to verify defendant's
entitlement to use the vehicle, he exceeded the scope of
detention permitted for a routine traffic stop when he asked
defendant whether there were any weapons or narcotics in the
vehicle.

However, the trooper's conduct was arguably proper

under the law as it then existed.
26

Under Arroyo, as recently

clarified .by the Utah Supreme Court in Thurman, defendant s
consent to search was no 1: Dbta.ined b;} po 1 i ce exp] oi 1:at :i on o£ a
prior illegality and Is therefore valid.
CONCLUSION
For the forego j ng reasons, 1 hi'i C'MIJI t shorn H

riff inn 1 In

trial court" s denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3,7*^ day of January, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney Genera1

TODD A. UTZTOGER*
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 iereby certify that s * rue and accurate copy of the
: . i »r _. . g t ; . ~

. .

. r-

.:. it ., postage prepaid,

Andrew McCullough, attorney for appellant, 930 South State
Street, Suite 10, Orem, Utah 84058, this

day ui January,

1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

:! District Ceuu, iuz-j t'ur.i

r iL2D

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
Criminal No. 82-E

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON,

:

Defendants.

:

The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing
upon the defendant's Motion to Suppress on November 15, 1991. The
defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and represented by his
attorney,

W.

Andrew

McCullough,

and

the

defendant,

Michael

McNaughton, was present and represented by his attorney, Milton T.
Harmon.

The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr.,

Juab County Attorney.
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the
State of Utah and the defendants and having reviewed the Memorandum
of Law submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the
premises and the Court having previously entered its Ruling dated
1

January 14, 1992, now makes the following:

WNMWS OF FACT
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol,
observed a motor vehicle in the area of Nephi, and visually
estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle.
The officer had received training and certification in estimating
of speeds.
2.

The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a

paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60
m.p.h..

He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of

giving the driver a hand signal to slow down.

Neither the driver

nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them
to slow down. The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent
of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding.
3.

The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee

Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant,
Michael McNaughton.
4.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the

driver and asked for a driverfs license and registration.

The

driver produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce a
registration.

The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and
2

f7

he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but could give no
further information concerning his name or where he lived.
the driver searched

While

for the registration, he appeared to be

extremely nervous with the hands trembling.

The occupants had no

written authorization or anything that gave them the right to be
in possession of the vehicle.
5.

The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC computer to

determine if it was reported stolen.

The request came back

negative, but the officer continued to investigate the possibility
of a stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of finding
stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as stolen.
6.

The officer then asked the driver if there were any

weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. The driver said there
was not any.

The officer then asked for consent to search, Mr.

Ziegleman unhesitatingly replied "help yourself".
7. The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and
found nothing of substance. The officer then asked for consent to
search the trunk, which consent was again given by the driver.
Again no contraband was found therein. The officer then search the
hood area.

Between the right front fender and the battery was an

oil cloth covering a brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine
contained therein.
8. Both defendants were then arrested for possessing cocaine
3

9J

with the intent to distribute.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The stop of the defendants1 vehicle by Trooper Bushnell

for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law.
2.

The continued detention of the defendants after the

initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants
inability to produce a registration

for the vehicle or any

authority to be in possession of the vehicle.
3.

The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily consented to a

search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress
by the officer.
4. Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle.
5.

Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied.

Dated this

-sBistrict Judge

4
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ADDENDUM B

.. -• Otttrtct Court, Jutb C _umv

^

FlUD

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

Pat P. Greenwood.Clerk

S T A T E OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

Case Number:

vs.

RULING

BRENT ZIEGLEMAN AND MICHAEL
MCNAUGHTON

GEORGE

E.

82-E

BALLIF,

JUDGE

Defendants.
**********

This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions
to suppress cocaine, which was found in the hood of a car
defendants were driving. Defendant Michael John McNaughton filed
his motion on August 26, 1991 and defendant Brent Ziegleman filed
his motion on September 6, 1991.
The Court, having proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and
also having considered the motions and memoranda, now enters its:
RULING.
The Court denies defendants' motions in that the officer
was justified in making the initial stop of the vehicle, he had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to detain defendants,
and he obtained a valid consent to search to vehicle. In the event
that either the initial stop or subsequent detention are flawed,
then under a fourth amendment search and seizure analysis the issue
of standing and of a reasonable expectation of privacy would arise.
However, in this case defendants have not established that they had
such an expectation, especially in the hood area of the vehicle.
1.

Deputy

2.
POINT ONE—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE INITIAL STOP
The Utah courts have held that a police officer may stop
an automobile for a traffic violation committed in his presence,
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), and that an officer
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a
citation.

State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990).

In

this case the officer, who was certified at estimating the speed of
vehicles, believed that there had been a speeding violation.

He

testified that he attempted to warn defendants of this, but because
they would not look at him, he pulled them over to relay this
warning.
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye contact was
the cause of the initial stop for speeding, it was only due to the
fact that the officer had been unable to warn defendant Ziegleman
about his excessive speed by giving hand signals.

This behavior

did not, in and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there
was more serious criminal activity going on. Although the officer
considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as evidencing guilt
in certain circumstances, those behaviorisms in the later part of
this investigation only served to reinforce other findings as the
investigation continued.
POINT TWO—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP

DEFENDANTS

In Robinson, the Utah Appellate Court held that once an
officer has obtained a valid driver's license and evidence of

3.
entitlement to use the vehicle, the driver must be allowed to
proceed on his way.

Here the driver, Brent Ziegleman, could not

produce a registration for the vehicle, and the only entitlement
to use the car was his claim that his friend "Bill" had loaned him
the car.

He could provide no further information about "Bill."

In State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) it was stated
that an officer may seize or detain a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime.

Here, the officer has testified that he

suspected that the car had been stolen. Therefore, he detained the
defendants in order that he could check with NCIC to see if the
car had been stolen.
POINT THREE—THE OFFICER OBTAINED A VALID CONSENT TO SEARCH THE
VEHICLE
It is unclear from the facts whether the officer asked for
consent to search the car while he was waiting for the results from
NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was not listed as
stolen when he asked for consent.

In any event, it is undisputed

that Ziegleman replied, unhesitatingly, "help yourself."

This

seems to be voluntary consent and, in fact defendants have not
alleged any police coercion or duress, but claim the search is
invalid under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. However,
the initial stop was valid, the subsequent detention was valid,
and the contraband was discovered under the hood of the car
pursuant to a valid consent to a search, and thus it is admissible.
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POINT FOUR—DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO OBJECT TO A SEARCH OF
THE HOOD AREA
The foregoing analysis assumes that defendants had standing to
object to the search, pursuant to a fourth amendment search and
seizure analysis. However, in the event that the initial stop, the
subsequent detention or the search were flawed in some manner, the
issue does arise whether defendants had standing, or had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area, to begin with.
According to Utah case law, the legitimate expectation of
privacy test is a fact sensitive and not a bright line test. State
v. Grueber. 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989).

In State v. Taylor, 169

Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. September 12, 1991), it was held that
a defendant can have a legitimate expectation of privacy if he is
the owner or is in possession of the property with the permission
of the owner, and that "in order to be sufficient for fourth
amendment purposes, a subjective expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
In this case, defendants admitted they were not the owners of
the vehicle, could produce no registration for it, and could not
produce evidence that permission had been given to them by the true
owner to use the car.

All they could say is that "Bill", about

whom they could give no details, had loaned them the car. The only
circumstance implying permissive use of the car was that they were
in possession of the car.

This is not sufficient to establish a

reasonable expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, even if defendants had such an expectation in the
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passenger compartment of the vehicle, they most likely did not have
a subjective expectation of privacy in the area under the hood of
the vehicle.

Pursuant to Taylor, this is certainly not an

expectation that society would recognize as reasonable, when they
were not the owners of the vehicle and have not established that
they had the permission of the true owner to use the vehicle.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

/ H day of January, 1992.

BY THE COURT

^GEORGE F. BALLIF, JUDGE

cc:

Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
W. Andrew McCullough
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